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Two recent articles by Japanese researcher Mr. Hideo
Matsunaga (1991, 1994)2 in The Journal of the Pacific
Society prompt me to think about Chile's relationship to its
Pacific territory, Rapanui, as the people of Easter Island call
themselves and their land.
In the course of commenting on Matsunaga, and a source
about Japanese ambitions in the Pacific contemporary to his
documentation (Shimizu 1938), I want to explore my
explanatory concept of "Uncertain Sovereignty" by which I
mean the ambivalence that I think always has characterised
Chilean official feelings about Rapanui since their
relationship formally began on 9 September 1888 when
Policarpo Toro read his proclamations and hoisted his
country's flag along side the existing Rapanui one (see Hotus
et al 1988).
"Uncertain sovereignty" I take to mean an unconscious
official attitude, provoked by the circumstances of
Colonialism's culture (Thomas 1994) which at once
discomforts government opinion, provokes aggressive
reactions to criticism and abidingly prevents effective policy
and action.
Outsider Claims
Prior to Chile's annexation, there had been other
claimants to Rapanui, the earliest one being in 1770, when
through their colony in Peru, Spaniards concluded a
successful visit to the place with a formal annexation of their
"San Carlos Island", complete with signed document and
appropriate military ceremonial (Mellen 1986).
Although first sighted by Europeans in 1722, it was not
until 1862 that slave raids, disease and out-migration
subdued the Rapanui population. For some time in the 1860s
to 1880s it was unclear which European power had control of
the place France (who had missionaries there), Britain
(whose Navy had collected a moai, or ceremonial figure, there
in 1868) or the USA, whose influence was growing in the
Pacific. Additionally in the last three decades of the 19th
century, Russian, German and Chilean warships had stopped
for visits, to collect artefacts and publish their reports (For full
listing, see McCall 1976; 1990).
The respective exploring parties of three countries,
France, Britain and the USA, had recommended annexation,
as did the German one in 1882. Spain's earlier claim had been
completely forgotten after a century and never has been
revived.
When Chile annexed Rapanui in 1888, it would seem that
the uncertainty surrounding the sovereignty of Easter Island
would abate. But, even then, there was alleged trouble. In the
library of the Bishop Museum, there is an unattributed
clipping from a San Francisco newspaper with a story about
how France and Chile fought a naval battle over the latter's
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claim to the island. This speculation was totally untrue, and
seems to be based on an over-inventive seamen's account to a
credulous reporter who, perhaps, paid for the information?
The French Consul in San Francisco, Pesoli, writes to Paris
on 21 September 1888, including a clipping from another San
Francisco newspaper, the Daily Report of 19 September,
indicating perhaps the basis of the sea battle rumour. The
article declares:
'Great indignation is felt in all the
islands', said Mr. Thorne, 'over the seizure
of Easter Island by Chile. Captain Toro of
the cruiser Angamos planted the Chilean
flag and took possession in the name of his
Government. What makes the people on the
neighbouring islands feel so bad is the fact
that Chili is going to establish a penal
settlement there, and they have no desire for
that kind of neighbours.
When in Papeete Captain Toro was
very proud of his seizure, and when
remonstrated with by the French officers
offered, if they would sail their men-of-war
outside, to fight them, one after the other.
The offer was not accepted,]
In the French National Archives there is a letter dated 12
December 1902 explaining away a reported rumour ("bruif')
in Peru that Chile was about to cede Rapanui to the USA4 A
few years later, there was an exchange of letters between the
(British) Foreign Office and Williamson Balfour, the latter
wanting to urge His Majesty's Government to purchase
Rapanui from Chile. These negotiations, when they were
discovered, prompted some minor changes in the
administration of the place which, for the most part, has
languished unattended under the Chilean mandate for much
of its history, until the last three decades.
Again, concern over sovereignty surfaced in a story
circulating in 1984-5: the publicised threat of an American
base being re-established on the Island. There was a secret
communications base on Rapanui from 1966 to the election of
Socialist President Dr. Salvador Allende, in 1970, but it
quietly did its work as the island was infrequently visited
5
On
the election of Allende's left-wing government, the USA
contingent of the base summarily departed, leaving equipment
and a few dozen illigitimate children who today wonder about
their distant fathers, safe in the anonymity of a large and
distant land.
The question of sovereignty in 1984 arose when NASA,
the (USA) National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
proposed to establish an emergency landing site for their
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Voyager space shuttles, complete with full radar facilities.
Many people internationally were suspicious of NASA's Cold
War motives and actions and saw the Chilean government (at
that time, a dictatorship)'s eager acquiescense a sign that the
country was willing to trade part of their control of Rapanui
for American money. In the event, and after careful treaty
negotiations into 1986, NASA's scaled down plan was
accepted, but never fully implemented owing to the
suspension of the American space program early in that year
as a result of a launch disaster.
In 1988, to mark the centennary of the acquisition of
Rapanui by Chile, the Islander citizen's committee, Te Mau
Rapanui (often called the "Rapanui Council of Elders")
published a detailed monograph, demonstrating the
contemporary population's relationship to their land, and
decrying the almost century of neglect that the island has
suffered under Chilean rule (Hotus et at 1988). The
monograph does not question Chilean sovereignty, but it does
suggest strongly that Rapanui has never been treated
equitably by the Chilean Government.
Chilean Claims
To an outsider looking at Rapanui and Chilean affairs,
the Elders's charge of derelection makes reasonable sense. In
the beginning of the relationship, a Chilean Naval Captain,
Policarpo Toro Hurtado, convinces his government to
purchase the commercial interests on the island, to permit
him and his brother, Pedro Pablo, to carry on the French
founded sheep and livestock ranch and to license
"immigration". Only about twenty Chileans respond to his
call and settled on the island in 1888, the year of the
annexation. Then, in 1892, the Toro brothers's ship sinks,
most of the colonists depart or had died and the ranch is
abandoned. For half a dozen years, there is no record that
either Chilean government or private interests sent anyone to
check up on their toe hold in an Oceanic empire. And. the
Government, as is well-known, never paid completely for the
Tahitian-based commercial interests, nor ever re-imbursed
the Toro brothers for their colonisation expenses.
The story gets worse.
An unscrupulous entrepreneur, Enrique Merlet, acquires
the ranching concession and sends a representative, Alberto
Sanchez Manterola, to the island, where the elected (in 1892)
King of Rapanui, Simeon Riro 'a Kainga Rokoroko He Tau,
receives him well and attempts to come to a mutually
congenial agreement with the outsider commercial interests.
who soon were to usurp legitimate Rapanui claims. If King
Rim had known what was going to happen to himself and his
people, he might never have feasted Sanchez so well, nor
offered him such abundant hospitality. In 1899, Merlet, with
Sanchez's knowledge, has King Riro assasinated, dismisses a
remorseful Sanchez and installs an Englishman, Horace
Cooper, to brutalise the Rapanui population into submission
and starts making expansive and extravagent claims to
ownership of the entire island.
Merlet begins propogating the story so well known to
outsiders, Chilean and foreigner, that a decadent King Riro
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drank himself to death whilst in Chile and that the Rapanui
were half castes and only remotely related to the original
inhabitants of the island (see e.g. Metraux 1940).
Apart from occasional visits by the Chilean Navy.
accounts of which were published in Chilean Naval
publications, the Chilean government in the early part of this
century makes no intercession or move to assist the
population it so happily annexed a little over a decade before.
It is not until 1914, and then only after a mis-understood
revolt (See McCall 1992) that results in a full Naval enquiry.
that the first Chilean government representative is installed in
the place. Prior to that, the manager of the commercial
interests, an English-Scottish company, played Government
representative as well.
Even after that, it was not until the Catholic Church,
through Mgr. Rafael Edwards, intervened that the education.
health and general well-being of the Rapanui were taken up
by the Chilean Government, reluctantly. By "reluctantly". I
mean that the Government charged the commercial interests
with implementing health and education at their expense,
which was kept always at a minimum. The Chilean
government benefitted from lease payments and meat supplies
for its ships, but returned none of this to the Rapanui or the
island.
So, the Rapanui languished on their island. forbidden to
leave it for much of this century. even confined to a few
hectares of home and agricultural space in the areas known as
"Hangaroa" and "Moeroa" today (For more detail. see McCall
1994).
An Offer to Imperial Japan
In the 1930s, French ambitions in the Pacific had long
since cooled (See Bare 1987), Germany was thinking about
other parts of the world, the USA had its Great Depression
and Britain was struggling with a tempestuous Europe.
However, another growing world power was making itself
increasingly well-known in the Pacific. the import of which
would be much clearer in a few years time.
Mr. Shin Shimizu (1938). formerly editorial writer of the
liji Shimpo, writes his explanation of the Japanese interest in
the South Seas, which is published in English by the Foreign
Affaires Association of Japan in November 6
Shimizu (1938 I) notes that he writes his thirty-one
page pamphlet because he "feels he must do .. to seek to
correct certain false impressions which have influenced other
nations in the attitude they have taken up towards our
[Japanese] quite legitimate activities in the South Seas".
The writer claims a 400 year antiquity of Japanese
interest in the South Seas, noting that there are Japanese
citizens spread around Southeast Asia and that they have had
success in agriculture, fishing and commerce due to their
"exceptional industry and a physical constitution which made
them fit to work in tropical countries", noting especially his
countrymen's successes in the Philippines, then ruled by the
USA (Shimizu 1938:2) He has especial praise for Japan's
fishermen who brave the elements and hostile foreign
governments in their quest for a good catch (1938:5--6)
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He (1938: 7) notes that in 1936, the Japanese government
had evolved "an effective South Seas policy", including the
creation of a South Seas Section in the Foreign Office and,
simultaneously, the South Seas Development Company which
were to be concerned with the sending of migrants to South
Seas places, the acquisition of land leases, "monetary
assistance for development work" and anything else required
to strengthen Japan's position in that region.
Shimizu (1938:9) comments also on the increased
Japanese Naval activity of the day, noting that it is for defence
and to "safeguard our national rights, elevate the national
prestige and promote the nation's development". Whilst not
directly relevant to the argument here, one of the motivating
factors in Japan's push to the South Seas is her growing
population, outstripping local resources. Shimizu
(1938: 18-20, 28-29) writes that land in the South Seas is
sparsely occupied and poorly developed. Japan's surplus,
energetic population should find a home there, he affirms,
which they could profitably develop for all humankind.
Shimizu (1938:30)'s penultimate paragraph is pertinent
to the next part of our story. He writes:
The Japanese are far from attempting
to change the colouring of the world map;
they only desire to get an outlet for their
overpopulation at least in the South Seas. It
is desirable that the various governments of
the South Seas will lease part of their
territories to Japan or at least make
arrangements whereby the Japanese can
carry on some industrial undertakings
therein to the extent of providing a
livelihood for her surplus population.
So, the context is right for Japan in the 1930s to be
interested in acquiring South Seas lands and Chile, owing to
its history of neglect and disinterest, is prepared to realise
cash from a wortWess (from their point of view) and neglected
territory. These two interests, unbeknownst to the Rapanui, of
course, meet for a couple of months in mid-1937.
Given that context of Japanese expansion and the need to
develop what they consider undeveloped lands, a potential for
Imperial interest in Rapanui becomes plausable. even though
the remote territory is small compared to the other lands being
sought
Whilst distant from Chilean interests, both government
and commercial. Rapanui in the 1930s is a thriving operation
for the Williamson, Balfour company. The company have all
the cheap labour they need, are largely unfettered by Chilean
government requirements and have ready markets for the
wool and other ranch products produced which are exported
directly overseas to South America and Europe. Exploited for
half a century as a "Company Island", Rapanui is a
comfortably profitable enterprise for it's foreign developers
and their frankly named, "Easter Island Exploitation
Company" (See Porteous 1978, 1981, 1993; cf. Hunt 1951).
Matsunaga begins his discussion of the Japanese
evidence for Rapanui being put on sale by Chile by reporting
that in an earlier publication of a former Japanese
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Ambassador to Chile, Mr. Eiji Kawasaki, in the Nihon Keizai
Shimbul1 (Japan Economic Times) of 30 June 1975, mentions
for the first time in print the Rapanui deal.
In the course of a brief description of Rapanui and its
history, Kawasaki (deceased in 1985) reports that his
superior, in 1938, Mr. Tetsuichiro Mayake, had "heard of the
rumoured
7
intention of the Chilean Defence Ministry to cede
Easter Island to Japan". Kawasaki continues his tale:
Needless to say, Ambassador Mayake
reported this [offer of cession] to the
Japanese Government The Japanese Navy
was keenly interested in the island, However,
negotiations were informally discontinued
due to the island's proximity to Australia8
and the detrimental effects that this might
have had on the course of Anglo-Japanese
and US-Japanese relations".
Matsunaga investigates further and discovers that
Mayake was appointed Ambassador to Chile on 25 July 1936;
Kawasaki served, as he said, as a temporary acting
Ambassador in September 1940, and returned home due the
outbreak of World War II in the Pacific after the Japanese
bombing of the American military installations at Pearl
Harbour in December 1941.
Matsunaga continues to dig and finds a document in the
Japanese Foreign Ministry dated 7 July 1936, which contains
a general description of Rapanui and its contact history,
including the conditions of the lease of the sheep ranch
company, Williamson, Balfour. Matsunaga believes that the
document was a background paper for the sovereignty transfer
discussions. References in the document suggest that at least
commercial discussions were taking place, with the idea of
Rapanui as a potential base for the Japanese fishing industry.
represented by the large commercial company, Nihon Suisan.
Nihon Suisan was asked to be a party to the Rapanui
negotiations since it was a fisheries firm, with shipping and
trawling interests throughout the Pacific. In September of
1937, the Nihon Suisan's ship, Tonan-maru 11, commenced
whaling in the Southern Pacific for the first time, so a base in
Rapanui would have been very useful for their purposes.
But, Nihon Suisan, in its published company histories
examined by Matsunaga, does not mention these negotiations.
Perhaps they were too speculative or, given the turbulent
events of World War II, simply forgotten?
Matsunaga too suggests that other, more commanding
world affairs were occupying the Imperial Navy and the
Japanese Government at that time: 1937 was the year when
the Sino- Japanese War erupted. It was also a year when the
Axis powers (Japan, Germany and Italy) were firming up
their "Anti-Comintern" agreements which had been
developing for some time.
What Matsunaga might have speculated is that the
approach regarding Rapanui might have been on the initiative
of an individual, rather than the official government Whilst
Chile was neutral during World War II, there were many Axis
sympathisers in the country. Rapanui was a fairly obscure
place in the 1930s and it could be that the negotiations were
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not so much on the level of government, but by interested
individuals, eager to please a country with whom they
sympathised. That is, a Chilean official, could well have
approached the Japanese Ambassador with a plan for either
economic cooperation or, even, cession of sovereignty, but
probably did so as an individual, rather than on behalf of
official government intentions.
It is unlikely that the Chilean concerned was more than
remotely familiar with Rapanui. The individual who provided
the Japanese Legation in Santiago with some details of
economic life on the island had little navigation knowledge,
for the position of the place was given as 25° SLat and 105°
E! Matsunaga picks up on the error, which placed Rapanui
near Singapore!
The correct coordinates, incidentally, are 27° 5' SLat and
109° 20' W.
I sent a brief manuscript critique of the first Matsunaga
(1990) article to him, through the Pacific Society in Tokyo. In
rebuttal, he goes back to archive sources to discover further
evidence that the negotiations were very official and not just
an indivuduaJ's private urges. In his "revised" second article,
Matsunaga demonstrates, I think, that the negotiations
between Chile and Rapanui were more than the rumours they
seemed to be in his first report.
The author embarked on a detailed examination of
Japanese Diplomatic archives, especially the 32 cases of
"Cesion and rental of territory of various countries and
miscellaneous rumores" (A-4-1-0-1), most especially that
section dealing with Chile: "Information from Latin
American Countries, Miscellaneous: Chile (A-6-4-0-13-3)",
which has resulted in additional light being thrown on this
incident which. in its Japanese and Chilean context, does not
seem so bizarre after all.
The Chilean Government is recorded as having offered
Rapanui for sale to the highest bidder on 8 June 1937. Two
days later. notice of this is sent to Tokyo in a top secret, coded
telegram by the Japanese Legation in Santiago de Chile. The
text 9reads:
On the 8th, a call was received from the
Under Secretary of the Chilean Navy. Mr.
Hara 10 made his way to the office and the
Under Secretary says the following: Owing
to a difficult financial situation, the
government wishes to sell Easter Island and
Salas y Gomez to Japan, England, the USA
or Germany, by order of the President and
the Ministry of Defense. It is wished to
know if Japan is interested in acquiring it,
that this information should be
communicated to your government and we
wish a rapid reply, since this matter as yet
has not been communicated to any other
country.
Diplomat Rara takes the matter very seriously. The
exchange between the Japanese diplomats in Santiago and
their superiors in Tokyo is conducted in top secret code, as a
mark of the importance placed on the Chilean offer. It is
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further revealed to the Japanese diplomats a couple of days
later that "The Chilean Navy needs to construct some cruisers
and other war ships and in order to do that needs extra
finance; therefore, the proposal to sell some islands of little
importance to Chile".
This observation of "little importance to Chile" of
Rapanui is entirely in keeping with the history of negligence
ofthe time that I mention above and described in most serious
Chilean sources on the place. Moreover, the sale is to the
highest bidder since the Chilean Government does not fix a
price for their real estate; they would take the highest price
offered, they told the Japanese. If the Chilean government
contemplates selling national lands, it is going to do it for top
dollar!
A telegrame from the Japanese Legation in Santiago to
Tokyo of 1 July purports to quote the President of Chile who
says that "according to the law, we (the Government) must
obtain the approval of the Congress". At the same time, the
telegramme notes that the Chilean Government is no\\
carrying on negotiations with the USA as well as Japan. B)
14 July, a parcel of information about Rapanui is sent by the
Japanese Legation to Tokyo, and included amongst those
papers is the fanciful book by E. C. Branchi (1934), L 'Isola d,
Pasqua. Impero degli antipodi which was indeed published ir
Santiago three years before, but is wildly inaccurate on mOSI
points to do with the island. Branchi was an amateur partisan
of the sunken continent story of Oceanic origins. There is a
note appended to these materials:
As it [Rapanui] is very distant, with
poor soil, there are no minerals. nor any
good harbour for anchorage, and also has
no strategic value. for these reasons, the
Chilean Government retains these islands
[sic] only to isolate lepers and expatriate
criminals (7)11.
Taking all this into account, the Director of American
Affairs, Mr. Yoshizawa, writes on 23 July (sent on 26 of the
same) to both the Director of Administration of the Ministry
of the Navy, Mr. Toyota, and to Mr. Tamura, the President of
Nippon Suisan. the fishing company. In this note. he
summarises the Japanese Navy response as:
l. It [Rapanui) doesn't seem to have
much value from the point of view of
military strategy, but in spite of that it would
be better to have the place:
2. In the future when aviation is more
developed, this island certainly will be of
great benefit; nevertheless, at this moment,
it has very little value as an air base;
3. From the point of view of industry,
the geography of the bay is suitable for a
fishing base, but the Ministry of Fisheries
and the specialist companies in that area
should be consulted;
4. From the diplomatic point of view,
it is evident that the USA would oppose this
as a Japanese possession, so that although it
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would be a military objective, one ought to
refer to its [Rapanui's] ends [for Japanj in
terms of fisheries. (8)
From the Japanese documentation, the consideration to
purchase Rapanui lasted a scant two months, from the first
telegram of 9 June to the closing letter of 9 August, with no
further notations, as other events distracted Japanese interest
or, perhaps, the Chilean government met some internal
opposition to the cash raising proposal.
Matsunaga firmly places the eventual failure of the
negotiations on larger world events. The 6 July 1937 letter
from the Japanese Government Director of American
Affaires, Yoshizawa, to Tamura, President of the Nippon
Suisan fishing interests, a natural developer of Rapanui,
pre-dates by one day the "Rokokyo Incident" which sparked
the Japanese-China War. At that crucial time, Japan did not
wish to risk displeasure either with Britain, the nationality of
the commercial concessionaire on Rapanui, nor the USA's
jealous guard of South American relations through its oft
insisted "Monroe Doctrine" dating back to 1823.
The President of Chile mentioned in the dispatches was
Arturo Alessandri Palma (1868-1950), in his third term. His
period in the Presidency commenced in 1920, ceasing in 1924
with a military coup, returning in 1925. In 1932, Alessandri
was elected President again, continuing his promises to cure
Chile's recurrent economic problems. The year after the brief
negotiations with Japan, his government lost in elections to a
"Popular Front" because in spite of an improved economic
situation, Alessandri was said to have not taken sufficient
interest in social welfare.
Colonialism and Uncertain Sovereignty
As is not unusual in colonialism, much of the
negotiations of a subject people's fate takes place without
their consent or, even, knowledge. Almost contemporary with
the Chilean offer to sell Rapanui to the highest bidder is the
story that Vanuatu was offered by Britain and France as a
homeland for Jews from Nazi Germany. Noted journalist,
David Jenkins, read documents a few years ago in USA
government archives of moves on the eve of the Pearl Harbour
bombing to sell or give Papua New Guinea to the Japanese, to
appease the needs of the growing empire and to avoid war. 12
Chilean plans for Rapanui are discussed and agreed in
Santiago, only later are they brought to the island as
decisions. Chile, in these sorts of relations with Rapanui, is
not unique as a metropolitan power dominating a distant
territory. Between nominally sovereign states, much foreign
aid discussion takes place distant from those who eventually
are to receive programmes which often are unsuitable and fail
due to lack of local consultation.
Matsunaga demonstrates clearly that the 1937
negotiations between Japan and Chile were very real. There
are other allegations of sale, though, that are much more
speculative. During my second field trip (1984-5), I was told
by two different persons that Chile was negotiating with the
USA (or Japan) to transfer the island in exchange for a
cancellation of outstanding foreign debts.
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As the little Polynesian polity has greater contact with the
world, there is less lag time between what people outside
Rapanui are saying about the place and what people locally
know.
To cope with this uncertainty and the perceived threat of
decisions being taken without local consultation, Rapanui
(like others) resort to rumour. On Rapanui itself, gossip and
rumour play a large role in community life. Gossip, the
discussion of a third, absent party by two or more persons
present, is a method of building connections and associations.
By the very act of listening to gossip, those present collude
against the topic of the conversation. Sometimes, gossip may
have a basis in fact, but as often it will be speculation and
conjecture: the purpose of the gossiping act is social, in terms
of bonding, and not informational.
Rumour is somewhat different. Its purpose is to clarify, to
answer, to attempt to solve what it unclear and rumour on
Rapanui usually centres on the actions of outsiders and their
intentions, since these are so poorly communicated and
explained locally.
For example, the story of a naval battle between France
and Chile in 1888 that I mentioned above was reported to me
during my first fieldwork from 1972-1974 in two ways. One
informant located the action at the time of the Chilean
annexation, much as I rt:counted it above; a younger person
suggested that it had almost taken place in 1965, when a
young Rapanui school teacher led a successful protest for
human rights on the island that resulted in the territory
becoming a full civil one in 1966. Some others transformed
this rumour into gossip and told me that it was the school
teacher who had summoned the French warships, which story
persists in some quarters, even official ones, to this day!
Rumour, therefore, in the colonial context, can be taken
as a kind of informational protest; a cry from a local minority
against an impenetrable national bureaucracy; an attempt to
escape what the sociologist Max Weber called the "Iron
Cage" of contemporary, invigilated society.
I do not believe, as I first thought, that the 1937
Japan-Chile negotiations over Rapanui were rumour. Clearly,
they had a very serious basis in factual, albeit brief,
communications. In the conlext of Japan's views of itself as
having a legitimate right, even need, to expand
populationally, militarily, cdmmercially, even territorially,
into the South Seas in the I930s, as Shimizu documents, she
was a natural potential buyer from a cash strapped Chile. The
fisheries angle provided added interest to the negotiations.
Chile's Uncertain Sovereignty
This leads me to the question of Chile's "uncertain
sovereignty" that I mention in the title of this historical
enquiry into a tiny footnote.
I do not believe that Chile has been at ease with its
colonial stance, and the Rapanui have been aware of this for
some time. On the one hand, there were the needs of national
pride, some way of marking the victory of the "War of the
Pacific" and Chile's projected role in the international
community. In the European scramble for colonies of the
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1880s, having a colony was to become an important country
and, so, Chile was pursuaded to follow suit, unlike any of the
other South American republics, mostly founded on the
French revolutionary ideals of "liberte, egalite and
fraternite". Chile had no need to expand into the Pacific,
having sufficient colonisable land in the recently (then)
pacified South. And, desolate though it was, there was the
land to the north with its rich promise of mineral wealth.
Chile's act of colonialism was not out of desperation, but out
of pride. Chile had no practical use for Rapanui and,
particularly in the 19th century, had severaJ ranches many
times the size of Rapanui on its own mainland. Chile did not
need the Rapanui lands and did not have the facilities to
exploit the Rapanui seas. The colonisation was a mistake and,
therefore, the Chilean government abidingly has
demonstrated an uncertainty, even an ambivalence, as in the
negotiations for sale I cite above, about its singular colonial
possession.
Even when no actual negotiations were in train, Rapanui,
in their own uncertainty about Chile's official intentions,
imagined deals being made, as usual, behind their backs.
The Chilean government did not know what to do with
Rapanui at the end of the 19th century and scarcely has come
to any conclusion about what to do with it at the close of this
one. The government archives are choked with plans for
Rapanui and every few years, ernest governments create new
commissions to study what is to be done with Rapanui, a
distant place about which few Chileans know anything other
than that they should feel a kind of paternaJ affection.
Government ministers and, since the dictator Pinochet,
Chilean Heads of State, visit Rapanui, bestow a public work
or two and depart with promises of radical change and
improvement. Each commission affirms its intentions to do
real work, unlike predecessors, and succeeds only in planning
for tropicaJ development in a sub-tropical environment, the
production of produce that will be too expensive to sell
anywhere, owing to distance and, more recently, the
encouragement of tourism without taking into account the
poor transport infrastructure by the government monopoly
airline, LAN-Chile.
To take a recent example, in late 1994, another
commission has been created in response to Rapanui
demands to be taken seriously. In October 1994, the "Island
Commission of the RegionaJ Council" went to Rapanui,
" ... with the aim of analysing together with the organised
community of Easter [Island] a proposed law to redefine the
place's legal status,,13 President Eduardo Frei, during a four
hour stop over on Rapanui, announced on 10 November the
construction of a new air terminaJ, airport renovations and a
sea port, opened a new Governor's Office, offered to turn over
additional government lands to the local population and to
increase flights (Air Force and LAN-Chile) to the island '4.
The visit was marked by a protest of Rapanui carrying their
own flag, who were not permitted to enter the area where the
President was making his promises.
As 1994 ended, yet another government commission was
announced by President Frei, this time to present "specific
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plans" for the Chilean mainland regions of Aisen and
MagaJlanes, along with Rapanui. This commission is to ~
"interministerial" and, as usual, it begins by gathering
information about its territory of focus, as if the task had
never been done before l5 The interministerial and the
RegionaJ Council Committees almost certainly will deliver
conclusions in 1995 much like those that have been produced
in the past and, most likely, with similar misunderstandings
and consequent errors.
On the basis of this indicative Japanese incident, and
others aJluded to above, I believe that Chile will continue to
be troubled by its "uncertain sovereignty" over Rapanui until
it changes the way that it has related to the place since 1888.
That was the last time that the Chilean government, though
Captain Policarpo Toro, took even minimal interest in
consulting the Rapanui themselves. Government
commissions rarely have Rapanui on them and there has
never been an open, public consultation on the island itself by
a decision-making, ranking government body. The two
bodies created at the end of 1994, by their very governmental
nature, have no Rapanui representation and, apart from the
usual comfortable visit to the island that these committees
make, usually for a few days, there will be no open, public
consultation with the Islanders.
Therefore, the information that goes into these official
and costly enquiries remains inaccurate and fanciful and,
consequently, so do the conclusions and recommendations
that result, however well-intended. Chile will continue to
suffer its official angst of "uncertain sovereignty" so long as
it continues to fail to consult the Rapanui about Rapanui.
The Islanders have long been willing to talk, but they
have yet to find anyone in power in Chile free from the fear
of "uncertain sovereignty" to listen to what they know about
their island and what should be done with it.
Footnotes
1. Grant McCall teaches social anthropology at the University of
New South Wales.
2. Both these references are in Japanese. Matsunaga (1991) was
translated for me by William Purcell, while Matsunaga (1994), with
further evidence for his case (prompted by his reaction to my
commentary on his earlier piece, he says) was translated by
Taiheiyo Gakkai Shi, and kindly sent to me by Dr. Juan Grau, of the
Ecologicallnstitute of Chile.
3.Archives d'Outre-Mer, SG Oceanie, A-121, c131, Pesoli, Gerant
du Consulat de France, San Francisco it Colonies et Marine, 21
septembre 1888.
4. Archives d'Outre-Mer, SG Oceanie 141, Dossier B25.
5. The American "secret" base in the 1960s actualiy was a joint
facility with the Chilean Air Force, although official documents that
I have seen suggest that the line of command was not always clear.
When Dr. Allende was a parliamentarian and visited Rapanui, he
was refused permission to inspect the base. However, the few
tourist parties venturing to the island in 1967 and 1968 often were
invited by the American commander to take coffee and donuts on
the base itself. My first visit to Rapanui was in one of those parties
in November 1968.
6. I read a copy of this in the French Archives d'Outre-Mer in
Aix-en-Provence, catalogued under "BR. 10720B".
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7.. In a brief personal interview in June 1994, Matsunaga told me
that the translation "rumomed" should have been more like "talked
about", for reasons that he is able to demonstrate in his reasearch.
8. This false assertion is based on the incorrect geographical
positioning of Rapanui as being near Singapore, which Matsunaga
mentions further on.
9. Matusaga quotes in Japanese the original Japanese text. I must
work from the translation in Spanish by Taiheyo Gakkai Shi,
already credited above. It is likely that nuance may have been lost
but, I think, the plain meaning text is clear enough.
10. Mr. Takeshi Hara was the Military Attache to the Japanese
Legation with considerable knowledge and experience of the
Spanish language and Latin American affairs. He had been
decorated by foreign governments at his previous postings and had
been in Chile since 1930 Hara would have been easily able to tell
a "rumour" from a concrete government olIer through his
experience and his network of contacts in the country.
II. These page numbers refer to the unpublished Spanish
translation by Taiheyo Gakkai Shi.
12. David Jenkins (pers. com.) told me that the documents contained
a note that for the deal to go through, of course, Australia and the
Netherlands, "owners" of New Guinea Island and surrounding
territories, would have to be consulted I
13. EI Mercurio (Valparaiso), 23 October 1994
14. There were several articles reporting these events and romises,
but the most complete is by Elia Simeone Ruiz in EI Mercurio
Santiago) of 11 November I994.
J 5. EI Mercurio (Santiago) of 5 December 1994.
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Comment on the two hanau
Yaram Meraz, San Francisco
Two recent articles in these pages (Mulloy 1993, Langdon
1994) have renewed the old argument over the meanings of
the Rapanui terms hanau 'e 'epe and hanau momoko. Both
articles have a case to make, but neither presents a complete
story.
Langdon disagrees with Mulloy's interpretation of the
word momoko as meaning 'thin', suggesting that it was a
later intrusion into the language, postdating the first
recording of the hanau momoko tradition, but predating
Englert. Presumably, Langdon would have it originally mean
'short-eared', in contrast with 'e 'epe, presumably meaning
something like 'eared', from epe, 'earlobe'. However,
mokotl/oko with the meaning 'thin' or 'sharp' was recorded
by Roussel in his vocabulary, collected in 1865 (Roussel
1908, Churchill 1912), whereas no mention of the 'long ears'
or 'short ears' was recorded until twenty years later
(Thomson 1889). A more recent study (Johnston 1978, with
informant Sergio Rapu), attempts to provide a comprehensive
list of reduplicated words in Rapanui, and gives moko, 'thin';
Illokomoko, 'very thin' and momoko, 'thin (plural)'. The
pattern of full reduplication to indicate quantit.y and partial
reduplication to indicate number is almost universal in this
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